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Fred K. Drogula,
Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015. Pp. 432. Cloth
(ISBN 978-1-4696-2126-5) $59.95.

Students of Roman history are well aware that “commanders and command” had
a significant bearing on much of the politics of the res publica, through such key
concepts as imperium, auspicium, potestas, and provincia as well as the duties of imperium-wielding magistrates—consuls, praetors, and dictators. This book, therefore,
cuts to the heart of how Romans conceived of their res publica working and how they
ultimately administered the empire they acquired.
Drogula commences his discussion of military command (chapter 1) by pointing out that tradition held that civilian and military duties were combined in one
senior magistracy—the consulship—from the time that the Republic was founded
(in 509 BCE). However, Romans knew that praetors were the first commanders (a
praetor maximus is attested in the sources, for instance, and the general’s tent was
always called the praetorium). Drogula posits here and develops later (chapter 4) the
argument that the consulship was not established until 367 BCE, at which time the
praetorship became the subordinate magistracy. In the early Republic, he adds, wars
seem to have been fought by warlords with private armies, not by armies funded by
the state, which indicates rather a separation of civilian and military duties.
The ramifications of this separation of civilian and military duties become clearer in Drogula’s discussion of the spheres of magisterial power and authority, domi et
militiae (chapter 2), in which he is careful to distinguish the difference between the
power that civilian authorities exercised within the pomerium (potestas), conferred
by election in the centuriate assembly, from the power that military commanders
exercised outside it (imperium), conferred by a Lex Curiata. Drogula also is at pains
to show that magistrates could not exercise their imperium within the pomerium, as
many ancient sources and modern scholars (beginning with Mommsen) have long
contended (85–87). The magistrate assumed his imperium only after taking the auspices and exiting the city.
One exception to this rule prohibiting the exercise of imperium within the
pomerium was the triumph, when a commander clearly had to possess imperium
within the pomerium so that he could lead his troops in the ceremony and wear the
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military insignia of the triumphing general. However, this exception to the rule was
carefully regulated, and the privilege of a triumph was conferred only after a decree
of the senate and law passed by the popular assemblies (111–13).
A second exception was the dictatorship. The distinguishing characteristic of a
dictator was not was greater or supreme power (imperium maius or summum) vis-àvis other senior magistrates, Drogula argues, but rather his ability to exercise his imperium within the pomerium, which also explains why dictators were often appointed
to quell domestic unrest (118–21). Many early dictators were men of great distinction,
and they largely ruled alone (with the assistance of their Master of Horse), which
may have been why later authors assumed that dictators in general had greater power than consuls.
Drogula’s discussion of the dictatorship touches on a recurring theme of this
book, namely, that there was no such thing as imperium maius before the end of the
Republic; rather all magistrates with imperium had equal imperium, but what distinguished the consulship, say, from the praetorship, was prestige—such as, the number
of lictors and the fasces as well as the opportunity to win military renown (greater for
the consul than the praetor). This hierarchy of the Roman military command structure evolved over time and was greatly enhanced by the development of the idea of
provinciae as geographical areas (chapter 3). As is well known, the term provincia
originally denoted a task to be completed, but as the empire expanded additional
commanders were needed to administer it. The principle of prorogation, which was
the extension of a provincia, not imperium (as Drogula argues), also contributed to
the creation of permanent provinciae (chapter 4). Praetors, moreover, were usually
assigned to provinciae which had become geographical regions with defensive garrisons (e.g., Sicily) and thus enjoyed fewer opportunities for military glory. Consuls,
on the other hand, were still assigned provinciae as military tasks to be completed
(chapter 5).
The analysis to this point in the book lays the groundwork for the chapter on
the late Republic (chapter 6), which shows how the concepts of imperium and provincia came to be manipulated to the advantage of a few commanders. A few key
developments in the late Republic were crucial: first, Gaius Gracchus passed legislation requiring that provinces be determined before consular elections were even
held, resulting in permanent provinces with active wars being assigned to consuls
and thereby hardening the hierarchy of command between consuls and praetors
(298–301). Second, Marius had a political ally bring the matter of the provincial
assignment of Africa during the Jugurthine War to the tribal assembly, which transferred this command to him. This legislative innovation set the stage for the supreme
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commands of Pompey first against the pirates (Lex Gabinia of 67 BCE) and later
against Mithridates (Lex Manilia of 66 BCE), and of Caesar in Gaul (Lex Vatinia
of 59 BCE). Drogula insists that Pompey’s apparent superiority over other commanders as a result of the Lex Gabinia was due not to the conferral of imperium maius but rather of the manipulation of the notion of provincia, whereby he was allowed
to enter and take action in the provinciae of other commanders (322).
Augustus, as is well known, based much of his power and authority as Princeps on his division and administration of the provinces, controlling those with
active wars ongoing and legions present (imperial provinces) through legates (using
Pompey’s command in Spain as an authoritative Republican precedent), and delegating to the senate the public provinces that contained defensive garrisons (chapter
7). As Drogula declares, the senatorial aristocracy should have been appalled at an
arrangement that so severely curtailed its members’ pursuit of military renown. But
we should recall that the legati Augusti who commanded legions in the imperial
provinces were also members of the same senatorial aristocracy, and, although the
triumph was now closed off to them, they could still receive triumphal decorations
(ornamenta triumphalia) as rewards for their military success. Drogula also points
out that Augustus’ legates were of praetorian status (pro praetore) while the governors of the public provinces ruled as proconsuls, thus enjoying a higher magisterial rank. Indeed, two public provinces, Asia and Africa, though peaceful, became
crowning achievements of a senator’s career.
One last note on imperium maius: Drogula argues that this concept was first
broached, but never conferred, in 57 BCE by C. Messius in connection with Pompey’s
supervision of the grain supply (327). Cicero later proposed this unusual power for C.
Cassius in 43 BCE (Phil. 11.30) so that he would have supreme command in the war
against the supporters of Caesar. Thus Cassius could avoid Pompey’s predicament
in the civil war against Caesar in 49 BCE when he could not command but could
only cajole his fellow aristocrats to do his bidding, while his rival enjoyed undisputed
command of a well functioning war machine (329). Augustus took advantage of this
republican precedent, proposed by no less an authority than Cicero, in his second
settlement (23 BCE) so that he “could legitimize his intentions to influence affairs
in provinces not given to him by the state” (362–63).
Overall, this is a very impressive book, for it weighs in on controversial issues
that are fundamental to our understanding of how the Roman Republic worked.
Drogula’s argument, while at times repetitive (a result, I think, of analyzing issues so
closely intertwined that it is impossible to completely unravel them), is in the end
remarkably consistent, lucid, and persuasive. This book should be essential reading
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for anyone interested in how Romans conceived of magisterial power and authority
and ultimately how this conception informed the governing of their city and the
administration of their empire.
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